|
STACKELBERG BARGAINING AND STRATEGIC INEFFICIENCIES
Category: Economic Theory
Bargaining
Wednesday 28th August 2002, 09:30 - 11:00, Room: 1.5
Session Chair(s):
Andreas Westermark, Uppsala University, SWEDEN
|
Abstract:
|
In Rubinstein - Ståhl bargaining between two sellers and a buyer on prices and quantities, strategic inefficiencies arise, similar to the Stackelberg outcome. In equilibrium when goods are substitutes, agreement will be with the larger seller first. Efficiency is decreasing in the relative size of the sellers.
|
|
|
|
|
Find this file in the
\Papers\1631\
folder of this CD-ROM.
|
|
|
Customise
|
Customise your Event Programme to include your favourite papers, and email details of papers to friends and colleagues with the
online Programme
|
|
|
