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REINFORCEMENT, REPEATED GAMES, AND LOCAL INTERACTION
Category: Economic Theory
Game Experiments II Tuesday 27th August 2002, 09:30 - 11:00, Room: 4.3
Session Chair(s):
Frank Heinemann, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, GERMANY
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Abstract:
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We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies
from laboratory data in prisoners' dilemmas experiments. While theory
suggests more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless
ones, we find in our experiments either the opposite or no difference.
In this paper we investigate to which degree learning and
reinforcement explains this dependence on structure and information.
Starting from a very simple model we gradually develop a setup where
players use repated game strategies and choose among these strategies
using a simple reinforcement rule. We then measure to which degree
this model explain players' behaviour.
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Find this file in the \Papers\1440\ folder of this CD-ROM.
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