Kwansei Gakuin University

Executive Agencies and Privatization: Economics of the New Public Management

Email address: kmizuno@kwansei.ac.jp

Keywords: government governance, an executive agency, privatization.

JEL Classifications: H11, H52, L33

Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to explore a theory of government governance choice that explains what makes the differences among three organizational systems; an executive agency system, privatization, and a bureaucratic system. The results obtained in our paper are summarized as follows. First, we show that an executive agency system cannot achieve the first-best allocation of resources. However, it can induce more effort than a bureaucratic system. Then, we next show that the transition from an executive agency system to privatization can be more easily achievable than from a bureaucratic system.

PDF file of paper: mizuno.pdf

Session: Industrial Organization Theory II

Time: Saturday, 7 July, 2:15pm - 3:45pm

Room: D