Akita Prefectural University

On Fair Allocations and Indivisibilities

Email address: sun@akita-pu.ac.jp

Keywords: Indivisibility, money, equity, fairness, Pareto optimality, resource allocation.

JEL Classifications: C63; C71; D51; D63

Abstract:
This paper studies the problem of how to distribute a set of indivisible objects with an amount M of money among a number of agents in a fair way. We allow any number of agents and objects. Objects can be desirable or undesirable and the amount of money can be negative as well. In case M is negative, it can be regarded as costs to be shared by the agents. The objects with the money will be completely distributed among the agents in a way that each agent gets a bundle with at most one object if there are more agents than objects, and gets a bundle with at least one object if objects are no less than agents. We prove via an advanced fixed point argument that under certain conditions the set of envy-free and efficient allocations is nonempty. We show that those conditions are also satisfied by all the existing conditions. Furthermore we demonstrate that if the total amount of money varies in an interval [X,Y], then there exists a connected set of fair allocations whose end points are allocations with sums of money equal to X and Y, respectively. Welfare properties are also analyzed when the total amount of money is modeled as a continuous variable.

PDF file of paper: sun.pdf

Session: Game Theory

Time: Friday, 6 July, 3:30pm - 5pm

Room: D