p.2107

Identification of Standard Auction Models
Susan Athey
Philip A. Haile

p.2141

Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
Ed Hopkins

p.2167

A Game–Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
Marco Bassetto

p.2197

Optimal Auction with Resale
Charles Zhoucheng Zheng

p.2225

Discrete–Time Approximations of the Holmström–Milgrom Brownian–Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
Martin F. Hellwig
Klaus M. Schmidt

p.2265

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
Josef Hofbauer
William H. Sandholm

p.2295

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity
Fabien Postel–Vinay
Jean–Marc Robin

p.2351

The Law of Large Demand for Information
Giuseppe Moscarini
Lones Smith

p.2367

Mobility and the Return to Education: Testing a Roy Model with Multiple Markets
Gordon B. Dahl

p.2421

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
Richard McLean
Andrew Postlewaite

p.2455

Nonparametric Estimation with Nonlinear Budget Sets
Sören Blomquist
Whitney Newey

p.2481

Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
Gil Kalai
Ariel Rubinstein
Ran Spiegler

p.2489

Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
Haluk I. Ergin

p.2499

Estimation of a Censored Dynamic Panel Data Model
Luojia Hu

p.2519

Announcements

p.2527

News Notes

p.0

Submission of Manuscripts to Econometrica