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March 2010 - Volume 78 Issue 2 Page 833 - 842


p.833


Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games: A Comment

Martin Pesendorfer
Philipp Schmidt-Dengler

Abstract

Recursive procedures which are based on iterating on the best response mapping have difficulties converging to all equilibria in multi-player games. We illustrate these difficulties by revisiting the asymptotic properties of the iterative nested pseudo maximum likelihood method for estimating dynamic games introduced by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). An example shows that the iterative method may not be consistent.


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