The Econometric Society An International Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics
Home Contacts

New Journals

Editorial Board
Journal News

Monograph Series

March 1985 - Volume 53 Issue 2 Page 307 - 328


Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games

Ehud Kalai
Dov Samet


A family of monotonic solutions to general cooperative games (coalitional form games where utility is not assumed to be transferable) is introduced under the name of egalitarian solutions. These solutions generalize the notion that cooperating players within a coalition should have equal compensation for this cooperation where equal compensation is done in interpersonally compared utilities. The egalitarian solutions generalize the weighted Shapley values defined on the subclass of cooperative games with transferable utility and Kalai's proportional solutions defined on the subclass of bargaining games. It is shown that in the presence of other weak axioms the egalitarian solutions are the only monotonic ones. The monotonicity condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient to bring about full cooperation if we assume that the players are individual utility maximizers and can control their levels of cooperation.

Full content Login                                    

Note: to view the fulltext of the article, please login first and then click the "full content" button. If you are based at a subscribing Institution or Library or if you have a separate access to JSTOR/Wiley Online Library please click on the "Institutional access" button.
Prev | All Articles | Next
Go to top

Email me my password
Change your address
Register for password
Require login:
Amend your profile
E-mail Alerting
The Society
About the Society
Society News
Society Reports
Future Meetings
Past Meetings
Meeting Announcements
web this site
Site created and maintained by Wiley-Blackwell.
Comments? Contact
To view our Privacy Policy, please click here.